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PERSPECTIVE

Arabia Infelix: The War Devouring Yemen
SHEILA CARAPICO

F

or many centuries, European cartographers
labeled the southwest corner of the otherwise mostly desert Arabian Peninsula as Arabia Felix, or “Happy Arabia.” It was a place where
towering mountains trapped clouds blown in from
the Indian Ocean so that twice-annual monsoon
rains blessed terraced slopes and lowland wadis
with plentiful crops. Sadly, since fighting engulfed
the country in late March 2015, Yemen has never
been less felix.
The brutal war and humanitarian catastrophe in
Yemen are the consequences of domestic and especially regional power struggles. Often cast as a sectarian battle between Sunni and Shia Muslims, it
is more accurately understood on the one hand as
a banal rivalry between two discredited presidents
and on the other as an unprovoked counterrevolutionary war by wealthy Gulf monarchies against
a poverty-stricken republic where citizens rose up
against decades of inept, corrupt rule. As fighting
raged and coalitions on both sides unraveled, the
sectarian narrative also grew tattered.
Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis took to the
streets in sustained, colorful, peaceful nationwide
demonstrations for months on end in 2011, chanting the same slogan that toppled dictators in Tunisia and Egypt: “The people want the downfall
of the regime.” Armed tribesmen laid down their
weapons to protest. Young people wrote manifestos and staged street performances. Northerners
and Southerners, Zaydis and Shafa’is, peasants
and urbanites, women and men turned out in veritable unison. The Nobel Peace Prize committee
recognized a Yemeni woman, Tawakkol Karman,
a gifted public speaker, as a symbolic leader of the
Arab Spring.
The Gulf dynasties fretted over the North African uprisings, but were especially alarmed by the
raucous clamor for revolutionary change on their
proverbial doorstep. Eventually the carbon kingdoms persuaded a reluctant President Ali Abdullah Saleh to relinquish power to his long-serving

vice president, Abdurabbu Mansur Hadi. Instead
of regime change, the protesters achieved only a
regime makeover.
Hadi, the only candidate, “won” a two-year
term in an election in February 2012 hastily arranged under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an association of the six oil
monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula comprising
Saudi Arabia and the smaller states of Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar.
The so-called GCC Initiative also granted Saleh
and his family immunity from prosecution and left
him as the leader of the party with a parliamentary majority. Concurrently, it funded a National
Dialogue Conference of over 650 Yemeni delegates
from various constituencies that was intended to
facilitate a post-Saleh, post-Hadi transition. The
conference, meeting with international consultants in five-star hotels, dragged on inconclusively.
Eventually, the feuding presidents proved willing to destroy the country in order to restore dictatorship. Their respective alliances complicated
and sectarianized the nasty rivalry between the
two self-serving, nonideological secularists.

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
In a counterintuitive turn of events, in September 2014 Saleh joined forces with a group called
Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), also known as
the Houthis—a ragtag militia from the far north,
near the Saudi border, that had waged six separate regional rebellions against his regime. The
Houthis are a self-styled Zaydi revivalist movement within the Shia school of Islam, opposed to
Wahhabism, the ultraconservative Saudi brand of
Sunni Islam. They marched on Sana’a, the capital,
to protest policies announced by Hadi—especially
a fuel price increase recommended by the International Monetary Fund and a scheme (devised by
foreign consultants and announced after minimal
domestic debate) to reorganize provinces into six
“federal” regions that left the Houthi’s homeland
landlocked.
The national armed forces, in which Saleh
loyalists retained essential commands, offered
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no resistance as the Houthis entered the capicupy, control, and subdue Aden and the third
tal. Hadi was placed under house arrest. Saleh’s
major city, Ta’iz, which they subjected to a bitter
party, the General People’s Congress, expelled
siege after encountering fierce local resistance.
him. In early 2015, he fled to his hometown of
They also recruit and exploit child soldiers.
Aden, the onetime capital of the old People’s
When they manage to shoot a few missiles across
Democratic Republic of Yemen (or South Yethe northern border into Saudi Arabia, they do so
men), which existed until 1990. In Aden and the
indiscriminately.
south, an overwhelming majority had yearned
However, the most devastating humanitarian
for renewed separation from “unified” Yemen
and economic repercussions are inflicted from
since the 1994 civil war. In late March, Hadi
above and beyond by the superior firepower of
went into exile in Riyadh and appealed to the
fighter-jets, helicopter gunships, and naval warships—all manufactured in the West and dekingdom to reinstate him in the presidential palace in Sana’a. Frequently referred to as the “inployed by the Saudi-led coalition. The United
ternationally recognized president,” but lacking
States, the United Kingdom, and several other
NATO powers explicitly or implicitly share rea domestic constituency or mandate, he nominally “governs” from exile.
sponsibility for the onslaught. The Obama and
On March 26, 2015, the new Saudi king,
Trump administrations arranged the sale of over
Salman, and his son Muhammad bin Salman, the
$300 billion worth of Hellfire missiles, cluster
defense minister, launched what they called Opmunitions, and other advanced weaponry to Saueration Decisive Storm on Hadi’s behalf. The dedi Arabia alone, and have participated directly
clared motivation for the Saudi-led intervention
in operations with in-air refueling, surveillance,
was and is to thwart Iranian influence in the penand training. American, British, and other arms
insula. Because Zaydism is
industries profit from the
a sub-denomination of Shia
wanton and largely pointless
Islam, the Saudis see Ansar
belligerence. Boeing, LockThe feuding presidents proved
heed Martin, Raytheon, and
Allah as an Iranian proxy.
willing to destroy the country
Honeywell Aerospace are the
Despite the absence of any
in order to restore dictatorship.
major US suppliers and conphotographic or physical
tractors to the Saudis and the
evidence, Riyadh continually
UAE.
insists that Iran is smuggling
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and a few coalition partweapons to the Houthis—and US officials occasionally repeat the claim.
ners such as Egypt have enforced a draconian air
Thus the convoluted power struggle in Yemen is
and naval embargo, ostensibly to block the importation of Iranian weapons but in fact, according
frequently characterized as a battle of Sunni against
to international humanitarian organizations, also
Shia. This simplified sectarian frame, widely reitobstructing shipments of food, fuel, medical superated in the international media, implicitly places
plies, and even the arrival of foreign journalists.
the Saudi-led coalition alongside al-Qaeda in the
The Sana’a airport’s runways were bombarded.
fight against the Zaydi-Shia Ansar Allah. But in a
The main Red Sea port at al-Hudaydah was delibseparate conflict ongoing in Yemen, the Americans
erately put out of commission; inspectors refused
continue to fire drone missiles and occasionally
to allow replacement equipment to be imported.
other weapons at suspected al-Qaeda positions,
Air strikes in most parts of the country disabled
while concurrently siding with the Saudis against
water and power supplies, damaged or closed
the Houthis. The local branch, known as al-Qaeda
hospitals and clinics, left craters in roads, topin the Arabian Peninsula, has benefited strategipled bridges, and blasted markets, factories, gas
cally from the general mayhem, particularly in the
stations, hotels, and cultural sites. Hadi and his
southern regions where it has established a presforeign backers shut down the banking system,
ence and seems to be fighting alongside Emirati
so that civil servants—including first responders,
forces against the Houthi and Saleh militias.
health-care providers, and sanitation workers—
WANTON DEVASTATION
went without salaries indefinitely.
The viciousness on all sides is extreme. The
Two and a half years into the Saudi-led intervention, some 21 million people—three-quarters of
Saleh-Houthi alliance has committed atrocities
Yemen’s population—face food insecurity or severe
on the ground, particularly in attempting to oc-
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malnutrition. Untreated sewage has contaminated
drinking water, causing what the United Nations
calls the world’s largest cholera epidemic—nearly
900,000 cases as of November 2017. Cholera is
treatable, but the crippled health care system was
already overwhelmed by patients suffering from
war wounds and starvation. Many of the afflicted
can’t reach hospitals because of damage to roads
and bridges.
Meanwhile, as many as three million people have
abandoned their homes. Prevented from traveling
abroad by the air and naval blockades and strict
border controls, and without systematic international assistance, they have sheltered with extended family, in makeshift tents, or in caves. It is worth
underscoring that the victims of internal displacement, hunger, disease, and bombing are disproportionately the already underprivileged Afro-Yemenis
of the Red Sea coastal region, who are Sunnis of the
Shafa’i denomination, not Zaydi Shia. They are not
supporters of either Saleh or the Houthis.
The internationally reported death toll from
fighting alone reached about 10,000 by October
2016. After that, the Ministry of Health and other
national and international agencies lost count,
while the pace of airstrikes accelerated—from just
under 4,000 in all of 2016 to 5,676 in the first half
of 2017, according to tallies from the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

SPLINTERING ALLIANCES
By the second half of 2017, events belied the
simplistic story of a conflict driven by Sunni-Shia
rivalries. Even the more convincing paradigm of
geo-strategic rivalry between Iran and the dynastic
autocracies of the Arab side of the Persian Gulf
failed to pass the most rudimentary reality test
when the Saudis and other GCC allies broke with
Qatar. The UAE, a major party to the foreign intervention (unlike Saudi Arabia it put boots on the
ground), has begun pursuing its own independent
policy in South Yemen. The alliance of GCC ruling
families no longer shares a common purpose; they
are are divided among themselves.
The temporary marriage of convenience between Saleh’s supporters and the Houthis is also
on the rocks. In September 2017, the two groups
staged large, rival rallies in Sana’a (the capital has
been under their joint control for three years). Unlike the joyful marches of 2011, when women and
children were front and center, these were menacing, heavily armed, all-male power displays. As internecine rifts in both camps threaten to widen and
deepen the violence, the overwhelming majority
of victims will continue to be innocent civilians.
The poorest country in the Middle East is paying a
heavy price for reckless, convoluted struggles for
supremacy among domestic, regional, and international powers.
■

